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VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR AIRCRAFT
OWNERS UNDER STATE LAWS
DONALD

B.

HILLIKER*

In recent years, the so-called general aviation industry has
grown rapidly as more companies have recognized the efficiencies that can be realized with the use of corporate aircraft to
ferry executives and others. At another level, the number of
recreational and student pilots is quite large. In 1975 there were
over 700,000 licensed pilots and close to 180,000 student pilots
2
in the United States.' These people fly some 180,000 planes.
Naturally, there must be a concern about the allocation of
losses in accidents involving these planes.3 Few individual pilots carry adequate insurance to cover the possibly catastrophic
losses should they become involved in a serious accident. In
fact, few owners have coverage adequate to meet possible losses
in the hundreds of millions of dollars should a small plane
cause a heavily-loaded commercial jet to crash.
While there should be attention given to those persons who
may be responsible to pay losses, the primary focus should be
on the availability of a remedy for those harmed in an accident
* B.S. 1966, Loyola University of Chicago; J.D. 1969, Northwestern University
School of Law; member, Illinois Bar.
1. According to the latest available statistics, there are about 730,000 pilots in the
country including about 178,000 student pilots. U.S. Dep't of Transportation, Federal
Aviation Admin., FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation, Calendar Year 1975, Table
7.1 at 87 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Handbook].
2. There are about 168,000 small aircraft registered in the United States. The small
single-engine, under five-passenger plane is the predominate type with almost 150,000
of these registered with the FAA. According to an FAA survey, the vast bulk of these
small aircraft are used for personal use. Besides the large number of small planes, there
has been a striking increase in the number of hours these planes are in the air. The
FAA estimates that 34 million hours were flown by small planes in 1975-up from 27
million in 1972. Most (over 70%) were flown by single-engine planes. Handbook, supra
note 1, Table 8.1 at 102; Table 8.2 at 103; and Table 8.8 at 106.
3. Commercial aviation recorded three fatal crashes in 1975 with 124 deaths. In
contrast, general aviation recorded 675 fatal crashes with 1345 deaths. Handbook,
supra note 1, Table 10.2 at 123 with Table 10.10 at 125. During the five year period
1971 through 1975, just under 7,000 were killed in small planes. Handbook, supra note
1, Table 10.10 at 125. Interestingly, the greatest concentration of private pilots, small
aircraft and airports is in the Midwest. Illinois has more aircraft and pilots than any
state except California, Texas and Florida. Illinois has the most airports in the country,
831 of a total of 13,000, and most are small with runways under 3,000 feet, supra note
1, Table 3.2 at 18.
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and for the descendants of persons killed in crashes. The owner
of the aircraft would seem a most logical person to bear these
losses and it is common for an owner to carry insurance for his
craft, whether an airplane or automobile. One particularly valuable tool under certain state statutes for reaching the aircraft
owner-the imposition on him of vicarious liability for the negligence of the pilot of his plane-has come under question in
recent years. As will be discussed, this remedy should be available and the case law supporting it is virtually unanimous. To
understand this issue a review of the leading federal and state
cases and the legislative evolution against the background of
the common law is necessary.
At common law, a bailor of an instrumentality was not
liable for the negligence of the bailee in most circumstances.'
Generally, it was believed that after an individual gives up
control, it would not be appropriate to hold him responsible for
the negligence of the bailee since he has no control over the
bailee's actions.' A number of exceptions were carved out of
this general rule in cases where courts found a degree of bailor
control over the acts of the bailee and believed that financial
responsibility for the acts of the bailee should rest with the
bailor.' For the most part, though, courts have been reluctant
4. See, e.g., Stanberry v. Gem City, 90 Idaho 222, 409 P.2d 430, 432 (1965); City
of Rockford v. Nolan, 316 111. 60, 146 N.E. 564, 567 (1925); Moreno v. Beckwith, 77 111.
App. 2d 443, 222 N.E.2d 918, 921 (1967); McQueen v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 229
Miss. 656, 91 So. 2d 740, 742 (1957); Mimick v. Beatrice Foods Co., 167 Neb. 470, 93
N.W.2d 627, 631 (1958). See generally BATY, VicAmous Lmarry (1916); 8 AM. JuR. 2d
Bailments §§ 258-59 (1963).
5. Prosser observes that in England in the sixteenth century, "it was considered
that the master should not be liable for his servant's torts unless he had commanded
the particular act." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 69 (4th ed., 1971),
at 458 [hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. Prosser sets out a good general discussion of
the whole subject of vicarious liability and the various fictions developed by the courts
to impose liability under varying circumstances. Of particular interest for this discussion see Prosser's observations relating to the development of vicarious liability for car
owners as an analogous situation is developing for small aircraft. He states:
The alarming increase in traffic accidents, together with the frequent financial
irresponsibility of the individual driving the car, has led to a search for some
basis for imposing liability upon the owner of the vehicle, even though he is free
from negligence himself. Bluntly put, it is felt that, since automobiles are expensive, the owner is more likely to be able to pay any damages. . . and that the
owner is the obvious person to carry the necessary insurance to cover the risk,
and so to distribute any losses among motorists as a class.
PROSSER, § 73 at 481.
6. Vicarious liability first developed in the master-servant area where the master
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to expand vicarious responsibility for the acts of a bailee in the
absence of legislation which would indicate that the general
rule should not apply.7
In 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Act was adopted,' and shortly,
thereafter several states enacted statutes modeled on the federal act.' This definition, or one substantially similar, is found
in these acts:
"Operation of aircraft" or "operate aircraft" means the
use of aircraft, for the purpose of air navigation and includes
the navigation of aircraft. Any person who causes or authorizes the operation of aircraft, whether with or without the
right of legal control (in the capacity of owner, lessee, or
otherwise) of the aircraft, shall be deemed to be engaged in
the operation of aircraft within the meaning of this Act."1
When the federal act was adopted in 1938, there was little or
no legislative history to help explain the meaning of the secwas held accountable for the acts of his servant and expanded into situations involving
joint enterprises in which each member of the joint effort would also be considered to
be doing the bidding of the other. Though various rationales were offered by the courts
for imposing vicarious liability, ultimately the ability of the master to control his
servant and the recognition of a need to have a source for recovery against the person
best able to pay and receiving the economic benefit from the acts of the person who
caused the injury were probably determinative. See PnossER, supra note 5, § 69 at 45859.
7. It appears that the inability generally of a bailor to control the acts of a bailee
makes the courts unwilling to impose liability. Exceptions, such as the family purpose
doctrine and ultrahazardous activities, involve an element (or at least a presumption)
of control by the bailor over the bailee. Deviation from the general rule has been by
way of legislation in some cases where no control can be found. See PRossER, supra
note 5 § 73.

8. Ch. 601, §§ 7 et seq., 52 Stat. 973 (1938), repealed by Federal Aviation Act, Pub.
L. No. 85-726, § 1401, 72 Stat. 806 (1958). The pertinent definition was incorporated
into the 1958 Act in full, 49 U.S.C. § 1301(26) (1958), and presently appears in its
renumbered form at 49 U.S.C. § 1301(26) (1970). For a discussion of the 1938 Act, see
H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3741.
9. ALA. CODE tit. 4 § 20(25) (1960); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 15-34(20) (1975); DEL. CODE
tit. 2, § 501 (1975); ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 151/2, §§ 22.11, 22.42a-22.42o (1963); IND. CODE
ANN. § 8-21-3-1(h) (Burns 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 328.1(14) (West 1949); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 183.011(16) (Baldwin 1971); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 6, § 3(24) (1964); MAss.
GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 35(j), 49B-49R (West 1975); MIcH. CoMP. LAws § 259.22
(1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 360.013(10) (West 1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 61-1-3(j)
(1973); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 1-1-0(10), as amended, § 1-102(11) (Supp. 1975);

§ 3-101 (1974); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 422:3 (1968); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 251(2) (McKinney 1968) (statute directly imposes vicarious liability); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 63-1(16) (1975); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 2(20) (1972).
10. 49 U.S.C. § 1301(28) (1970).
NEB. REv. STAT.
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tion. It is doubtful, too, whether any state legislatures left a
record of their thinking when adopting similar legislation."
However, in 1948, the federal act was amended to provide
specifically that certain persons whose interest in an aircraft
was essentially only that of a security interest should not be
liable for damages to certain persons or property caused by the
aircraft, unless the security interest holder actually controlled
the plane at the time of the damage.' 2 Most interesting, however, was the House Report which accompanied the amendment when proposed. That report quoted the definitional section of the federal act and observed in pertinent part:
Provisions of present Federal. . . law might be construed
to impose upon persons who are owners of aircraft for security
purposes only, or who are lessors of aircraft (on leases of over
thirty days), liability for damages caused by the operation of
such aircraft even though they have no control over the operation of the aircraft. This bill would remove this doubt by
providing clearly that
such persons have no liability under
3
such circumstances.1
This report, it was argued by some, indicated that Congress
had intended to impose liability on owners through the definitional language in section 1301(26) of the 1938 Act because the
legislators in 1948 conceded that the existing federal law could
be so construed and were enacting legislation to limit the possibility of such a construction. Reasoning from the definitional
language and other provisions requiring persons to operate aircraft safely, 4 plaintiffs sought successfully in state and federal
courts to impose vicarious liability on owners of aircraft for
injuries resulting from the negligence of the pilot."
In recent years, however, confusion has developed over the
federal courts' increasing reticence to imply a cause of action
under the federal act and the application of the reasoning of
11. There is no legislative history provided for any of the state statutes referred to
in note 9 supra, with the exception of the unique New York provision.
12. Ch. 482, Pub. L. No. 80-656, 62 Stat. 470 (1948), repealed and reenacted by
Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, §§ 504, 1401, 72 Stat. 774, 806 (1958), 49
U.S.C. § 1404 (1970).
13. H.R. REP. No. 2091, 80th Cong. 2nd Sess., reprinted in [1948] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1836.
14. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1430(a)(5) (1970); 14 C.F.R. § 91.9 (1976); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 8-21-1-1, 8-21-1-2 and 8-21-4-8 (Bums 1973). See also notes 61 and 62 infra.
15. See cases in text accompanying notes 16-20, 37-55 infra.
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those cases to state law.' 6 It is submitted that the decisions
under the federal act should not be read to affect the application of the state enactments. To place this issue in perspective,
a review of the treatment of the various enactments by the
federal and state courts is necessary.
ACT
Cases under the federal act have reached varying conclusions about the impact of section 1301(26). In some cases, the
courts have concluded that the federal act does impose vicarious liability on owners and lessors. In Hoebee v. Howe,' 7 the
New Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff,
who alleged a claim under the federal act and a virtually identical state law, stated a cause of action. Though the court there
did seem to be looking primarily to the state law, it did hold
that "the Trial Court correctly charged that causal violation of
CASES UNDER THE FEDERAL

the state or federal statutes. . . by the pilot of the plane would
18
• . .render the [owner] . . . liable.'
5 a Texas federal district
In Sosa v. Young Flying Service,"
court found that an action against the owner could be implied
from the federal act alone and sustained the action. Texas had
no law similar to the federal act and the plaintiffs, invoking
diversity jurisdiction, sued under the Texas wrongful death
statute for the negligence of a student pilot in a crash which
killed him and his three passengers. Balanced against these
cases were decisions finding no implication of a remedy for
20
various reasons.

In the late 1960's, a series of federal decisions concluded
16. See, e.g., Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir.
1970); Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo. 1969); Sosa v.
Young Flying Serv., 277 F. Supp. 554 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
17. 98 N.H. 168, 97 A.2d 223 (1953).
18. Id. at -, 97 A.2d at 226.
19. 277 F. Supp. 554, 557 (S.D. Tex. 1967). Note that the district judge certified
his decision for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1965), but no appeal
apparently was taken.
20. Yelinek v. Worley, 284 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Va. 1968) (dismissed action under
federal act for personal injuries against owner for negligence of pilot); Moungey v.
Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wis. 1966). In Moungey the action for personal injuries
against the owner for the pilot's negligence was dismissed because the court found no
persuasive reasons to indicate that the federal program relating to air regulation would
be assisted by a federal remedy. The court also observed that no inadequacies in
available state remedies had been brought to its attention. Id. at 451. See also Moody
v. McDaniel, 190 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Miss. 1960).
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that no private remedy could be imposed upon an owner under
the federal act. In the first of these, Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc. ,21 injured passengers and representatives of deceased
passengers sued the owner and the lessor of a plane which
crashed allegedly because of pilot error. Plaintiffs' counsel
sought a remedy under the federal act to avoid the necessity
of arguing which state law would apply to the case. The importance of the question is evident from the court's remark that:
"There is a pending question before this Court whether Iowa
law, which imputes a bailee's negligence to his bailor with respect to aircraft injuries, or Colorado law which does not, is to
be applied to the facts of this case.

' 22

The court rejected plain-

tiffs' claim for a number of reasons. First, the court could find
no compelling national interest in establishing a federal remedy and no particular need for uniformity of remedy. 2 It concluded, too, that there were adequate state forums in which
injured parties could seek relief. 24 In the absence of compelling
reasons to imply a remedy, the court was unwilling to take a
step that would require the development of a federal common
law of torts. 25 Rejected, too, was plaintiffs' argument that
House Report No. 209126 required the implication of a remedy
under section 1301(26). The court stated that:
The report.

. .

neither condones nor repudiates a construing

of § 1301(26) to impute liability to owners and lessors. It only
recognizes that this section as well as other more specifically
worded statutes may be so construed. We cannot accept the
interpretation of the report which plaintiffs urge upon us. It
is not clear that Congress by this exemption intended that
owners and lessors should incur civil liability contrary to
common law.Y
Ultimately, the court seemed most concerned with the implications of creating a federal common law of torts to deal with the
implied civil remedy.
In a variation of the approach in Rosdail, the plaintiffs in
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

297 F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo. 1969).
Id. at 682.
Id. at 683.
Id.
Id.
H.R. RP. No. 2091, 80th Cong. 2nd Sess., reprinted in [1948] U.S.
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1836.
27. 297 F. Supp. at 685.

CODE
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Rogers v. Ray GardnerFlying Service, Inc.,2 8 argued that by
enacting section 1301(26), Congress intended to pre-empt
under its commerce clause powers, Oklahoma law that the bailor of a plane is not liable for the bailee's negligence. 2 Here the
defendant was a sublessee under a long-term lease who rented
the plane to the deceased pilot under an oral agreement. The
plaintiffs argued that public policy supported what they saw as
the clearly intended conclusion by Congress to pre-empt state
law and place liability with those in a position to control the
use of aircraft and more likely to be financially responsible. 0
To support this argument, the plaintiffs looked first to the
definitional section and the section protecting security interest
holders from liability. From these, along with the section that
required operation of an aircraft in accordance with safety regulations and certain regulations which made negligent aircraft
operation illegal, the plaintiffs found a congressional intent to
pre-empt the Oklahoma statute.3 1 In rejecting the plaintiffs'
theory the court said Congress was "fully capable of making
. . . [the] intent [to pre-empt state law] clear directly and
not by indirection requiring the circuitous reasoning plaintiffs
'32
find themselves driven to employ.
The final blow to any implied action under the federal act
was struck by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in McCord
v. Dixie Aviation Corp.3 In McCord, a pilot rented a plane
from the defendant, the operator of a small airfield (known in
the industry as a fixed base operator) to transport the plaintiffs. Because of the pilot's negligence, the plane crashed and
the plaintiffs were injured. Applicable state law provided no
remedy and the plaintiffs made the usual analysis of the federal act. Refusing to follow the Hoebee rationale for a federal
28. 435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970).
29. Spartan Aircraft Co. v. Jamison, 181 Okla. 645, 75 P.2d 1096 (1938).
30. 435 F.2d at 1392.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1393. Pre-emption arguments under the Federal Aviation Act have been
rejected in several cases. See, e.g., Loma Portal Civic Club v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 61
Cal. 2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964) (state injunctive remedies to prevent
certain flight operations not pre-empted by the federal act's enforcement provisions);
Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639, 355 S.W.2d 436 (1962) (no remedy
under the federal act for the air carrier's negligence in operation of the plane as this is
concern of state law); Mittelman v. Seifert, 17 Cal. App. 3d 51, 69, 94 Cal. Rptr. 654,
666 (1971) (similar to Hurd case).
33. 450 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1971).
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cause of action, the court was not convinced by plaintiffs' argument that "it is the 'deep pocket' of the fixed base operator who
has the most assets to reach and that, as a matter of public
policy, it would be convenient, logical and consistently evenhanded to impute negligence to the fixed base operator." 34 The
court concluded that "[r]ecognition of the separation of powers rule leads us to the conclusion that . . . [plaintiffs'] contentions . . . should be directed to the law-making power35 of
Congress and not to the adjudicative power of this court.
While the federal courts' analyses may make good sense as
a reflection of the proper role of the federal courts and as an
interpretation of congressional intent in enacting section
1301(26), the public policy considerations suggested by plaintiffs in those cases are compelling.3 6 Some persons read these
decisions to mean that state laws with language like that of the
federal act should not be used to impute owner liability for the
bailee's negligence.3 1 Moreover, a recent commentator has concluded that the federal act interpretations constitute a trend
away from the imputation of liability under the state enactments.3 8 To the contrary, however, a review of the state law
interpretations and consideration of the traditional state role
in providing remedies for injuries to persons and damage to
property points to the conclusion that state laws generally have
been and should be interpreted to give rise to an action against
the aircraft owner for his bailee's negligence.
STATE LAW

In Lamasters v. Snodgrass, 31 the Iowa Supreme Court was
faced with an appeal from the dismissal before trial of a complaint for damages for personal injuries against the owner of an
aircraft for the negligence of the pilot. The pilot was a student
in a flight school operated by the owner and apparently rented
34. 450 F.2d at 1131.
35. Id. Accord, Sanz v. Renton Aviation, Inc., 511 F.2d 1027, 1029 (9th Cir. 1975);
Lockwood v. Astronautics Flying Club, Inc., 437 F.2d 437, 439 (5th Cir. 1971); Nachsin
v. De La Bretonne, 17 Cal. App. 3d 637, 639-40, 95 Cal. Rptr. 227, 228 (1971).
36. See text accompanying notes 64 to 67 infra.
37. See Ferrari v. Byerly Aviation, 131 Ill. App. 2d 747, 750, 268 N.E.2d 558, 561
(1971); Guillen v. Williams, 27 Misc. 2d 575, 212 N.Y.S.2d 556 (1961).
38. Comment, Lessor Liability in Aircraft Rental, 42 J. Am L. & CoM. 447, 464
(1976).
39. 248 Iowa 1377, 85 N.W.2d 622 (1957).
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or borrowed the plane from the owner.4" Recognizing the common law rule that a bailor is not liable for his bailee's negligence, the court found that the Iowa General Assembly had
altered the common law rule with the adoption of a statute
having language virtually identical to that of section 1301
(26).41 The court noted that the definitional language of the
Iowa statute was enacted in 1945 and that, subsequently, the
Iowa legislature enacted the following provision: "It shall be
unlawful for any person to operate an aircraft in the air-space
above this state . . . in a careless or reckless manner so as to
endanger the life or property of another."4 2 In 1949, it became
a misdemeanor to "operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless
manner." 3 In upholding the plaintiffs' claim, the court said
that it must sustain the contention that "the owner is, for liability purposes, identified with and treated as an operator...
[and that] [a]s the operator of an aircraft being operated in
careless or reckless manner . . . he would be negligent per se
and must be held liable to anyone damaged as a natural consequence of such conduct. ' 44 Commenting on its interpretation
of Iowa law, the court said that:
It is indeed hard to see any other reasonable interpretation of these laws. The words are clear, and while it may well
be as contended by defendant that originally the legislature
did not intend this chapter as one to give rise to an action for
tort, or to extend the owner's personal liability beyond the
common law provisions, by the recent amendments any
doubt as to the import of the language is removed. The owner
is made the operator when he causes or authorizes the use of
his aircraft, and the practical effect so far as liability is concerned is much the same as automobile liability placed on the
owner in Section 321.493, Code of Iowa 1954, I.C.A. 5
Other early interpretations of state laws like Iowa's came to
the same conclusion. In a case discussed earlier, 6 Hoebee v.
Howe,4" the owner of an aircraft was charged with the negli40. Id. at
, 85 N.W.2d at 623.
41. Id. at.,
85 N.W.2d at 624-26.
42. Id. at.,
85 N.W.2d at 625, citing IOWA CODE
43. 248 Ia. at - , 85 N.W.2d at 625.
44. Id. at ., 85 N.W.2d at 626.
45. Id. at -,
85 N.W.2d at 626.
46. See text accompanying notes 16 and 17 supra.
47. 98 N.H. 168, 97 A.2d 223 (1953).

ANN.

§ 328.41 (West 1954).
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gence of a student pilot who was flying the aircraft when plaintiff, standing on the ground, was struck by a horse frightened
by the plane. The court ruled that:
It seems to us from reading our act that the intent of our
Legislature is clearly to place responsibility on the owner,
even though he be without control, for the conduct of one to
whom he entrusts his plane. The language is unequivocal and
without qualification expressed or reasonably to be implied."
Unlike the decision of the Iowa court, however, the New Hampshire decision put some weight on the ambiguous House Report
No. 2091 and on the fact that vicarious liability of the airplane
owner merely stated the usual rule applied to ultrahazardous
49
activities .
In Hays v. Morgan,5" the plaintiff alleged that he was injured when struck by defendant's plan while negligently piloted by a third person. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed a decision for the plaintiff under a Mississippi law like
its New Hampshire and Iowa counterparts. Noting that one of
the purposes of the Mississippi aeronautics act was to promote
flying "consistent with the safety and rights of other persons,"
the court reviewed the act's definition of operation of aircraft
and concluded that "[i]t is the evident intent of the statute
to protect the public from any negligence and financial irresponsibility of pilots. . . .Under the statute, the liability arises
out of the facts as a matter of public policy."'" The Hays court
did not rely on federal law in reaching its decision. It was
interpreting state law only, and made no mention of House
Report No. 2091 or the federal act.2
More recently, the Supreme Court of South Dakota in
Heidemann v. Rohl,5 3 construed a Nebraska law like that of
Iowa, Mississippi and New Hampshire to make the owner lia48. Id. at

-,

97 A.2d at 225.

49. Id. at..., 97 A.2d at 226. At the time of the enactment of the New Hampshire
and federal acts, air travel was considered an ultrahazardous activity and not subject
to the usual rule that bailors are not liable for their bailee's negligence. See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520, comment b (1938). That rule has long been changed.
50. 221 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1955).
51. Id. at 482-83.
52. In Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d 1389, 1394 (1970), the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished Hays from its opinion there on the
grounds that Hays was only interpreting state law.
53. 194 N.W.2d 164 (S.D. 1972).
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ble in a wrongful death suit. In this case the owner rented his
plane to a pilot who, while carrying passengers from Colorado
Springs, Colorado to Sioux Falls, South Dakota flew into bad
weather and crashed. All aboard were killed. "4 After reviewing
the Nebraska statute the court said:
The Nebraska statute is substantially the same as the federal
law found in 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301(26).'The federal act -hasbeen
interpreted as a "definition" which does not create a new
cause of action, and does not pre-empt state law with respect
to liability for torts arising out of operation of airplanes. Iowa,
Mississippi and New Hampshire have statutes similar to the
Nebraska law which have uniformly been held to make the
owner responsible for the negligent conduct of one to whom
he entrusts his airplane. Although the Supreme Court of
Nebraska has not been called upon to interpret or apply...
their law, we may assume for the purpose of this action it
would follow the decisions of Iowa, New Hampshire and Mississippi.,,
In Heidemann, the defendant had argued that since the federal
act had been construed not to place responsibility on the'
owner, the state laws must be similarly construed. The court
properly noted, however, that questions of creation of a federal
common law of torts and preemption of contrary state laws
were not present in construing the legislative intent of the Nebraska legislature. 5 Moreover, the state enactments are expressions of the usual state concerns for health and safety while
federal law is more concerned with the need for uniformity.
In a 1974 case dealing with a similar Indiana statute,
Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 7 the court relied on
Hays, Lemasters and Hoebee in finding that Indiana places
responsibility on the owner for the careless and reckless operation of his airplane by another." In Allegheny, a student pilot
in a small plane collided with a jet passenger carrier on a landing approach to the Indianapolis airport and a disaster re54. Id. at 165.
55. Id. at 166 (citations omitted).

56. Id. The Supreme Court enunciated the standards for creation of a federal
remedy under state law in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
57. 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).

58. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also approved plaintiffs' theory under
the joint enterprise doctrine. For a thorough discussion of this important aspect of the
case, see Note, 41 J. Am. L. & CoM. 511 (1975).
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sulted. The student pilot's negligence allegedly caused the
crash. 9 In reversing the trial court's decision to strike allegations relating to vicarious liability, the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals said that "if the Indiana courts had occasion to
confront this issue, they would. . . [hold] the absentee owner
financially responsible for the negligent acts of a student pilot
to whom he had granted the use of his aircraft."" °
Only an Illinois intermediate court of appeals and the Minnesota Supreme Court have disagreed with the holdings of the
cases interpreting state laws to impose vicarious liability
through the definition of "operation of aircraft" on owners.6 '
The Illinois court's decision reflected the confusion which results from reading cases construing the federal act as applicable to an interpretation of the state law. The Illinois appellate
court relied on two federal cases interpreting the federal act as
not establishing vicarious liability to discredit the state law
interpretations. 2 In both cases, the federal courts were faced
with the imposition of a federal pre-emption of state law by
imposition of responsibility for another's negligence. Because
of considerations of federal-state comity and concern over the
problems of creating a federal common law of torts, the federal
59. Id. at 112.
60. 504 F.2d at 114. An Indiana appellate court has earlier approved an action
imputing liability to the aircraft owner for a pilot's negligence under Ohio law and the
federal act. Though Ohio did not have a statute like that in Indiana or the other states
mentioned in note 9 supra, that court relied, probably improperly, on the cases
construing those statutes. Ross v. Apple, 143 Ind. App. 357, 240 N.E.2d 825 (1968).
61. Ferrari v. Byerly, 131 Ill. App. 2d 747, 268 N.E.2d 558 (1971); Haskin v. Northeast Airways, Inc., 266 Minn. 210, 123 N.W.2d 81 (1963). Some commentators include
Guillen v. Williams, 212 N.Y.S.2d 556, 27 Misc. 2d 575 (1961), as a decision reflecting
an unwillingness to impose liability. See Comment, Lessor Liability inAircraft Rental,
42 J. AIR L. & CoM. 511, 514, 516 (1975). In Guillen a trial court held that the statute
relied upon had not been in effect at the time of the crash. The judge observed:
At the time of this accident there was no derivative liability on the owner of an
airplane unless the owner himself was negligent. . . .Section 251 of the General
Business Law, effective September 1, 1959, imposes a statutory liability on the
owner of an airplane for the negligence of one operating with the owner's consent. See, report of Law Revision Commission, McKinney's, 1959 Sess. Laws,
p. 1588 et seq. This accident occurred on November 19, 1958. As there is no
allegation of negligence by Mrs. Williams, [the owner] her mere ownership at
the time of the accident did not subject her to liability for the negligence of her
son, Roger [the pilot].
212 N.Y.S.2d at 557, 27 Misc. 2d at 577.
62. 131 Ill. App. 2d at 750, 268 N.E.2d at 560-61, citing Rogers v. Ray Gardner
Flying Service, Inc., 435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970); Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc.,
297 F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo. 1969).
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act was not read to impose vicarious liability. In fact, in one of
the cases the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically distinguished the factual setting from its earlier decision in Hays v.
Morgan where it interpreted state law only. Indeed, the fifth
circuit court suggested that if it were interpreting a similar
state provision its decision would be different. The court commented:
It is one thing to say that the words of a state statute impose
vicarious liability on the owner and lessor of an airplane.
When those same words embodied in a federal statute are
relied upon to widen state tort liability it is necessary additionally to consider federal-state comity and the requirement
that Congress clearly manifested an intention to exercise
fully its power under the commerce clause."
Moreover, the Illinois court found the state court decisions
unpersuasive because they purported to rely in part on the
ambiguous language in House Report No. 2091,64 but the Hays
court did not even mention the report, the Lamastercourt gave
little, if any, weight to it, and Hoebee looked to the report only
as supportive of its interpretation, not as the basis for it.
Preoccupied with considering federal and state cases, the
Illinois appellate court ignored provisions of the Illinois Aeronautics Act and the implementation of that act by the Illinois
Department of Aeronautics. 5 Furthermore, other sections of
the act and regulations required the owner to post a bond or
otherwise evidence financial responsibility should his plane
crash while being flown with his permission. 6 In sum, the Illinois decision represents a questionably reasoned opinion that
is contrary to all other state law interpretations of similar statutes and should not be followed by the Illinois Supreme
7
Court.
63. 435 F.2d at 1394.
64. 131 Ill. App. 2d at 751, 268 N.E.2d at 560.
65. See ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 15 , § 22.42 (1971). The Department's regulations
define operation of aircraft to include owners and lessors and make it unlawful for any
"persons [to] ... operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the life or property of others ...... Illinois Department of Aeronautics Regulations
1.11, 4.1.1 (1969). Moreover, the Ferraricourt did not give weight to a declared purpose
of the Illinois legislature to promote safety in flying. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 151/2, § 22.25
(1971).
66. See ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 151/2, §§ 22.42a, 22.42b (1971); Illinois Department of
Aeronautics Regulations 5.2, 5.3 (1969).
67. In Haskin v. Northeast Airways, Inc., 266 Minn. 210, 123 N.W.2d 81 (1963),
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Implicit in all of the state law interpretations is a recognition of the states' traditional role of exercising its police power
to promote safety and to provide remedies for its citizens. In
none of these situations were the courts faced with an argument
that required a federal law to be read to usurp state power in
an area of traditional state concern.
It is submitted that the interpretations imposing liability
reflect a proper statutory interpretation and good public policy.
A review of the cases shows a predominance of student pilots
or those with little flying experience becoming involved in accidents. These individuals-probably the highest risk pilots in
the air-rarely own the plane they are flying and often are not
adequately insured. Placing financial responsibility on owners
should provide a solvent source to look to for losses and encourage owners to carefully assess the conditions under which aircraft are put in the hands of inexperienced pilots." Though the
aircraft owner who holds his planes for rental is naturally inclined to rent as often as possible, the presence of potential
liability and increased insurance rates if an accident occurs
should encouarge more care by the owner."
the court was faced with a provision not found in most of the states with legislation
modeled on the federal act, to the effect that the liability of the owner of an aircraft
to passengers for damage caused was to be determined by the rules of law applicable
to torts occurring on land. Minnesota had the common law rule that bailors generally
were not responsible for their bailee's negligence. In light of this conflict between the
statutory provisions, the Minnesota court felt constrained to decide against vicarious
liability. The Minnesota law was an amalgam of the 1925 UNIFORM AERONAUTICS ACT,
which included the provision applying the rules of land torts to aircraft mishaps, and
the 1938 federal act. In sum, Haskin is not helpful when interpreting other state laws
having only adopted an act similar to the federal act.
Interestingly, Indiana has a similar combination of the two acts but the Seventh
Circuit did not find a conflict in Allegheny Airlines v. United States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th
Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
68. Some plaintiffs have been successful in reaching owners under a negligent
entrustment theory. Here the negligence is that of the owner, or more likely of his
employee, in entrusting the aircraft to the pilot. In Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United
States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975), the court ruled
that the plaintiff had stated a case under that theory because of the owner's giving
the plane to the student pilot under conditions which he knew or should have known
might be dangerous. In Anderson Aviation Sales Co. v. Lucy Perez, 19 Ariz. App. 422,
508 P.2d 87 (1973), the court found that a rental company had not properly checked a
renter's plans and abilities to make a proposed flight and sustained a jury verdict for
the plaintiff in a wrongful death action. See also Haskin v. Northeast Airways, Inc.,
266 Minn. 210, 123 N.W.2d 81, 83 (1963) (dictum); Boyd v. White, 128 Cal. App. 2d
691, 276 P.2d 92 (1954).
69. Only the better small aircraft rental operations have sophisticated and effective
controls over who can rent their planes and under what conditions. Some require not
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Finally, as a matter of policy, a uniform rule which would
impose vicarious liability on the owner for all airplane accidents, wherever occurring in the United States, would make for
fairer results for injured persons and easier and more predictable underwriting for insurers. Air travel is less local in nature
than auto travel since a pilot may pass with his passengers
through several states in a flight of a few hours. 0 He may meet
disaster in a state he never intended to visit but to which he
was forced to fly because of bad weather. The place of injury
is therefore often entirely fortuitous. It would seem preferable
to have one rule apply to a trip whether the accident occurs in
Illinois, Iowa or Minnesota. Moreover, insurers would be better
able to predict their liability and premium rates if a single rule
is applicable.
Though a national rule appears preferable, in its absence
the courts must take care not to inadvertently use federal law
interpretations to control identical state laws and thereby frustrate legislative intent and deprive injured persons in almost a
third of the states of what may be their only viable source of
recovery. 71
only test rides with a licensed instructor, but passage of a written test and compliance
with flight rules more stringent than FAA requirements. Unfortunately, these operations are not the rule, but the exception, particularly in rural areas.
70. See Note, 48 TEx. L. REV. 488, 490-91 (1970).
71. See generally, Comment, Lessor Liability in Aircraft Rental, 42 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 447 (1976), for discussion of other legislative attempts to deal with compensation
for injured persons and property in aircraft accidents.

